This paper bridges two related, but up to now, unconnected literatures: economic growth stability and population-economic growth. The paper is different from previous populationeconomic growth analyses by focusing on instability of economic growth in developing countries. This study contributes to a previous paper on the developing country growth collapse by adding important demographic variables. The paper provides an explanation for "new" negative correlations of population and economic growth: because 1960s were a relatively smooth time for economic growth, youth dependency did not seem important; however, during turbulent 1970s and 1980s, countries with falling dependency burdens weathered economic shocks better.
Introduction
An important purpose of this paper is to bridge two highly related, but up to now, rather unconnected literatures: the economic growth stability literature and the population and economic growth literature. Essentially, I combine a left-hand-side variable from the former literature with some of the right-hand-side variables of the latter. By providing a link between these two literatures, the paper also seeks to shed light on two emerging puzzles from these literatures: (1) why did some countries' growth collapse sometime during the 1970's, and others' did not; and (2) why did population growth have a negligible-to-no effect on economic growth during the 1960s and 1970s, but have a negative impact in the 1980s.
In this paper I follow a research strategy recommended by Pritchett (2000) : to analyze the determinants of changes in growth rates. Specifically, I examine how population may impact countries' abilities to withstand external shocks, and thus help explain the volatility of developing countries' growth, particularly in the last two decades. This paper is most like Rodrik (1999) , who argued that the presence of domestic social conflict and the institutions in place to deal with those conflicts impact how countries react to external shocks. He examined the change in per capita GDP growth over two periods 1960-1975 and 1975-1989, and various measures of shocks, internal division, and institutions of conflict management. He found that existence of social consensus and working conflict management institutions lead to greater persistence of economic growth. The social conflict-management institutions hypothesis was determined to be robust when considering alternative explanations for the growth collapse. Indeed, explanations like "more open trade regimes avoided trouble," "large public sectors were worse-hit," or "high indebtedness in the 1970s led to trouble" added little explanatory power.
The only population variable Rodrik used, however, is a measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, which comes from Taylor and Hudson (1972) . This variable is constructed from a 1960 USSR study, and measures the probability that two randomly selected persons from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. The rationale for including this variable, used by others in growth analyses (e.g., Mauro, 1995 , Easterly and Levine, 1997 , and Kenny, 1999 , typically is that countries with more divided societies will either have greater internal conflict or more difficulty implementing policies. But the study reported here indicates that another population variable-youth dependency-has a significant bearing on how external shocks impact economic growth. Yet, the populationeconomic growth literature has focused on youth dependency's impact on the level of economic growth, not focused as this paper is on the determinants of changes in economic growth, and the basic finding of that literature can be summarized as: youth dependency had an insignificant impact on economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s, but had a "negative, statistically significant, and large" impact in the 1980s (Kelley and Schmidt, 2001 ).
Background
Much of the early work on population growth and per capita income growth found little relationship between the two. Indeed, Kelley and Schmidt (1995) claimed the most important finding of the literature up to that point, ". . . is the failure, in more than a dozen studies using cross-country data, to unearth a statistically significant association between growth rates of population and of per capita output." This earlier work typically examined only aggregate population growth rates.
More recent work has either decomposed population growth into fertility and mortality components or considered the growth rates of important sub-populations (e.g., school-aged, working-aged, retired). These studies (Barlow 1994 , Bloom and Freeman 1988 , Brander and Dowrick 1994 , Kelley and Schmidt 1995 , Crenshaw et al. 1997 Williamson 1998) found a more complex role for population. Specifically, they found (depending on their exact explanatory variables) either that growth of the working-aged population is good for economic growth while growth of young, dependant population is not; or that increases in fertility or births have an immediate, negative impact, although the resulting eventual increase in the economically active population will have a delayed, positive impact. Thus, the demographic transition-the change from high to low rates of mortality and fertility-produces a "demographic gift" (Bloom and Williamson 1998) , "demographic windfall" (Crenshaw et al. 1997) , or "window of opportunity" (Barlow 1994) . The studies that break variables down according to time periods in their analyses (Bloom and Freeman 1988 , Brander and Dowrick 1994 , and Kelley and Schmidt 1995 found a stronger negative correlation between population growth and economic growth in the 1980s. This "new" negative correlation has not been fully explained (although Kelly and Schmidt 1995, unlike the others, do offer an explanation).
The developing country growth collapse-i.e., that growth in developing countries was much lower in the second half of the 1970s and in the 1980s and 1990s than in the 1960s or in the first part of the 1970s-is now well documented. Easterly (2001) calculated that the median per capita income growth rate in developing countries fell from 2.5 percent over 1960-79 to 0.0 percent over 1980-98. For the sample of 94 developing countries I consider, the average per capita GDP growth rate fell from 2.5 percent over 1960 -75 to 0.7 percent during 1975 -1992 . Pritchett (2000 calculated a single break point (or year) in each country's growth from 1960 to 1992 (or to the most recent year with data). For the 87 developing countries in his sample, only 24 had growth rates of less than 1.5 percent per year prior to their break year. However, after their break year only 26 countries had growth rates over 1.5 percent, and 32 had negative growth rates post-break. In a similar study, Ben-David and Papell (1998) calculated specific year break points in growth that are statistically significant for countries between 1950 and 1990. Twenty-one developing countries in their sample (which includes a total of 37 developing countries) had negative growth after their break point. (For the countries with negative post-break growth, those break years ranged from 1972-1983.) This collapse of growth is not, however, easy to explain by changes in what are widely regarded as determinants of growth. According to Easterly (2001) , indicators like educational enrollment, infrastructure, life expectancy, fertility, inequality, and real exchange overvaluation showed improvement over the 1980s and 1990s, while black market premiums, inflation, and openness failed to show the kind of deterioration that could explain the growth decline. Indeed, Easterly argued that, if models of growth using these indicators and policies were correct, developing country growth rates should have been significantly higher during the 1980s and 1990s than in the previous decades. Furthermore, external shocks (like wars, the oil crises, or the economic slowdown in the developed countries) can only explain some of the variation in growth during the 1970s and 1980s (Easterly et al., 1993 and Rodrik, 1999) .
For example, many of the high-growth, East Asian countries experienced external shocks at least as strong as those encountered in Latin America. Rodrik (1999) argued that variation in investment can not drive the variation in growth rates over short horizons, since investment rates are persistent over time-investment in one period is very strongly correlated with investment in the subsequent period. Thus, it seems GDP growth, particularly in developing countries, became much harder to achieve in the period beginning sometime during the 1970s.
This study is different from previous population-economic growth analyses in several important ways. First, rather than try to explain economic growth by assuming it is persistent (which the previously discussed economic growth literature shows it is not), I focus on explaining the important finding of the volatility/instability of economic growth in developing countries. Second, this paper suggests a new theory on how population may matter to economic growth (the old ways being through the size of the labor force and dependents' impact on investment and savings). That is, I hypothesize countries with large working populations relative to dependent ones may have more resilience to external shocks. This relationship could exist through the increased policy flexibility that having fewer dependants (and, thus, fewer "sticky" programs) may afford. Lastly, again by utilizing the recent findings on the instability of developing country growth, I calculate growth rates based on theoretically meaningful periods-rather than calculating a single rate spanning the available data set or using culturally appealing break points (i.e., the decades), as all previously mentioned population-economic growth studies did. These last two differences allow an explanation of the "new" population-economic correlation discussed above. In addition, like Bloom and Williamson (1998) and Crenshaw et al. (1997) , I use the more theoretically appealing agespecific growth rates, rather than birth and death rates. Specifically, I use the rate of change of the youth dependency ratio, which equals the difference between the growth rates of the working aged population and the young, dependant population.
Methodology and Data
Following Rodrik (1999) , I divide the sample into two periods, 1960 periods, -1975 periods, and 1975 periods, -1990 periods, . (Actually, I use 1992 or the most recent year for which there is GDP data. The specific countries used and their last year of GDP data is contained in the appendix.) There are a number of reasons to support this disaggregation. Pritchett (2000) calculated a mean break year for developing countries of 1977 and a median of 1978. In addition, Rodrik (1999) ran his regressions by dividing the sample into two periods using both 1975 and Pritchett's individual country break years, and got very similar results.
I begin by running two sets of OLS regressions, each with a different dependent variable. The first regression uses the difference between growth in the second period and the sample average growth rate for the second period. In the second regression, the dependant variable is, as in Rodrik (1999 Rodrik ( ), the growth differential between 1960 Rodrik ( to 1975 Rodrik ( and 1975 Rodrik ( to 1992 . I define all rates of change used in this paper as the natural log difference between the later data point and earlier one, divided by the number of intervening years. Rates of change are expressed in percentage terms. For GDP, I use the chain-linked index of real GDP per capita measured in 1985 purchasing power parity dollars from the Penn World Tables Mark   5. 6a. All population data comes from the World Bank Development Indicators 2000 (with the one exception of Taiwan, for which the data comes from the Monthly Bulletin of Statistics of the Republic of China). In the first regression, I am interested in explaining why some countries did much better than others during the second period, given that nearly all countries did worse than they did in the first period. In the second regression, I am investigating the degree to which a country's growth changes over the two periods. As it turns out, the answers look much the same for both questions. The index for government effectiveness/quality I use comes from a set of aggregate measures by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) . They compile six different measures of governance, each measure made up of data from various sources, and assign countries values ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 for each measure for which a country has some data. The six aggregate measures are: voice and accountability; political instability and violence; government effectiveness; regulatory burden; rule of law; and graft. For each country I calculate the average over the various measures (not every country has a value for each of the six different measures), and over the two years for which they report data (1998 and 2001) . I use their measures and take an average over the various measures so I can include in the regressions each country for which there is relevant population and GDP data.
A popular government quality index (but containing fewer countries)-which was used, for example, in Easterly and Levine (1997) and Easterly and Kraay (2000), from the Institutional Investor Risk Ratings, collected over 1960-1998-correlates highly (0.7) with the measure I use. In addition, Rodrik (1999) argued that measures like Freedom House's democracy index are very stable over time (the correlation coefficient across decades is 0.9).
Results: a first cut
Before discussing the regression results, I shall show the data. Figure 1 indicates the first puzzle mentioned at the top of the paper, i.e., many countries had very different growth experiences in the period 1960-1975 than in 1975-1992 [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] ; that is, greater economic growth is correlated with a larger decline in youth dependency.
Figures 1-3
The results of the first three regressions (using the two slightly different dependent variables described above) are shown in Tables 1 and 2 . The independent variables have the expected signs and are, in general, highly statistically significant. Most important, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, quality of government, the change in youth dependency, and the level of youth dependency in 1975 are all significant and impact as would be expected;
i.e., greater social division leads to greater susceptibility to external economic shocks (or lower growth in the later period), and a better quality of government and lower dependency burden (both change and level) lead to higher growth. Both the independent variable coefficients and their associated standard errors are essentially the same in the two regressions. The only exception is the variable for lagged economic growth. It is not statistically significant in the first regression (Table 1) , where it represents the per capita GDP growth from 1960-1975 minus the sample average for that period. This fact is not surprising given the relationship displayed in Figure 1 . In the second regression (Table 2) , the one most similar to Rodrik's (1999) , the coefficient, which represents per capita growth [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] Tables 1 and 2 Comparing the results shown in Table 2 , Column 1 with the results from the two most similar of Rodrik's regressions (reported in Table 4 , columns 5 and 6 of Rodrik), the magnitude, sign, and significance of most coefficients are quite similar to or the same as those Table 1 and Table 2 , Column 1, the results were essentially the same for both formulations (except that the lagged growth term was insignificant for the first formulation). Thus, for brevity and consistency with the Rodrik study, I report statistics only from the second formulation of the dependent variable (the growth differential) in all of the following tables.
In It seems reasonable, a priori, that countries heavily reliant on commodities would be susceptible to shocks (particularly of the energy induced variety). From Column 2, Table 2 it is clear openness to trade had nothing to do with the growth collapse (Rodrik, 1999, similarly finds three different trade variables statistically insignificant); however, the structure of exports (a variable not used by Rodrik) does have an impact. Countries heavily reliant on primary (nonfuel) exports will be more likely to experience a growth collapse. The coefficient for oil exporters, although not statistically significant at a standard level (the probability associated with its t-statistic is 0.77), is positive. This surprising result (i.e., a positive coefficient) may be explained by the fact many major oil producers, like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, were left out of the sample.
Further investigation
Initially, I believed the Sub-Saharan African or Asian countries would be the cause of any instability in the regression results. However, a series of Chow tests confirmed that the Latin American and Caribbean countries justified a structural change in the relationship. Latitude and distance from the equator are often used in growth regressions to capture both cultural (e.g., institutions) and/or environmental (e.g., the tropic's specific challenges for growth) impacts (see, for example, Bloom and Sachs, 1998 and Hall and Jones, 1999) . I include both a measure of north-south distance, LATITUDE (degrees latitude converted to decimals), and distance from the equator, DISTEQUAT (the absolute value of latitude). Table 4 , Column 2 indicates that debt burden had nothing to do with the growth collapse (again, confirming Rodrik's result). Given the insignificance of DEBTAV7277 (tstatistic of 0.02), the fact that initial GDP per capita and government institutions became significant is probably the result of excluding Puerto Rico from the data set. Table 4 North-south distance, or latitude, is significant (as shown in Table 4 , Column 3).
Indeed, the inclusion of this variable caused government institutions and ethnic fractionalization (at the 90 percent level) to become significant, and initial youth dependency (significant in Column 1) and openness to trade (which previously had a counter-intuitive, negative sign) to be insignificant. Moreover, the explanatory power of the regression was increased (R 2 rose to 0.92). However, distance from the equator, interestingly, is not significant (see Table 4 , Column 4) at a standard level (t-statistic is 1.3). The fact that latitude, but not distance from the equator, is significant and negative, implies that the specific geography of the Western Hemisphere is important, but environment (e.g., proximity to the tropics) is not. Since the continents in the Western Hemisphere have major axes that run North-to-South, countries tend to be similar according to latitude (as opposed to Eurasia, where countries of similar latitudes vary greatly).
Further evidence that latitude captures important similarities and differences among these countries in ways more popular measures do not was that variables for the percent of of a specific population.
Demographic influences revisited
The African, Mediterranean, and Asian countries are the ones for which demography was significant in explaining growth instability. For these countries, unlike for Latin Table 5 , Column 1 shows that youth dependency's impact on growth stability was driven by the negative impact of an increase in the young population, rather than a positive impact of an increase in working-age population, since the coefficient for this second factor is not statistically significant. (Likewise, the change in retired population was not significantly different from zero.) The explicit inclusion of the change in the young population meant that the level of youth dependency is not at all statistically significant, that the dummy variable for sub-Saharan Africa (usually negative and significant in growth regressions) is also not at all statistically significant, and that the dummy variable for primary exports is now only marginally significant (at or just below the 90 percent level). Table 5 , Column 2 indicates that a drop in infant mortality early in the period was correlated with a subsequent increase in economic growth (although not all at a standard level of statistical significance-t-statistic of 0.6). A non-significant (and certainly a non-positive) coefficient for infant mortality change is contrary to the Bloom and Williamson (1998) argument that population growth stemming from a fall in infant mortality should have an immediate negative effect on economic growth. However, given the apparent endogeneaity between economic growth and improvements in infant mortality, the relationship indicated in Table 5 i.e., higher GDP is associated with lower infant mortality, again suggesting divergence.
The most surprising result of the regressions shown in Table 5 is that the change in the working-age population is insignificant. The recent population and economic growth literature argues that working-age cohorts are the part of the population whose growth contributes to economic growth. One possible explanation for this insignificance is that the growth of the working-aged population, although good for economic growth, has little impact on the stability of economic growth. Another possibility is provided by Lindh and Malmberg (1999) , who break the working-age cohort down further, and find that for OECD countries young adults (age 15-29) have a negative impact on economic growth, while the 50-64 age group has the strongest positive influence. Thus, I break down the change in the working-age population into the change in the 15-29 age group and the change in the 30-64 age group. The coefficients for these two new variables (results not shown) were of opposite signs (coefficient for the 15-29 age group was negative) and of similar absolute magnitudes, as the new theory would predict; however, neither coefficient was statistically significant. Perhaps a further break down of the working-age population would find a cohort with a statistically significant positive impact on economic growth stability. Table 5 Next, I explore how prior growth in the youth population might be good for economic growth, in light of the surprising result that growth of the working-age population was insignificant, by considering youth population's interaction with human capital. It seems reasonable that if countries with growing young populations invest in education, they would reap benefits later on. To test this theory, I create and apply a number of interaction terms consisting of combinations of 1975 primary and secondary enrollment ratios (data from Barro and Lee) and earlier periods of young (ages 0-14) population change (1965-1975 and 1970-1980) . None of these interaction terms entered the regressions as statistically significantindeed, they all had t-statistics of one or less (results not shown). One explanation for this disappointing result is none of my interaction terms fully represents the benefit of a growing, more educated population (perhaps, because the dates I use to calculate the terms are not accurately capturing the timing of these effects). Another explanation is data quality-eight countries (from the initial 69) were dropped from the regressions because of lack of enrollment data.
Lastly, I look at how geographic variables (latitude and distance from the equator) may influence the growth collapse for this second group of countries. Not surprisingly, latitude (given the East-West orientation of Eurasia and, to a lesser degree, Africa) was not significant (results not shown). In addition, neither distance from the equator nor a dummy variable for the tropics was significant (results also not shown).
Conclusions
The paper makes a contribution by combining findings in two related, but until now, rather unconnected literatures. Specifically, I use demographic variables to help explain the instability of economic growth in developing countries, and in doing so, put forth a new hypothesis on how population may impact economic growth. In addition, the paper shows further evidence in defining the growth experience regionally.
Pritchett (2000) demonstrates the necessity of considering economic growth instability-particularly for developing countries. Rodrik (1999) shows that growth instability (or lack of it in the Asian case) is the defining characteristic of the Asian "miracle. " Bloom and Williamson (1998) illustrate that the demographic transition (from high to low rates of mortality/fertility) was an important part of the performance of the high-growth Asian countries. This paper pulls these findings together by demonstrating that the demographic transition (or lack of it) is valuable in explaining the stability of economic growth (or lack of it) for developing countries, even after accounting for institutional factors and other measures of social division proved relevant by Rodrik (1999) . Furthermore, this relationship between growth stability and demographic change holds true for countries other than the high-growth Asian ones. Indeed, adding the change in young population to the instability of growth regressions of Rodrik, led the sub-Saharan Africa and the Asian dummy variables to be statistically insignificant, when in typical growth regressions they are usually negative and significant and positive and significant, respectively.
The importance in these regressions of both government quality and youth dependency for African, Mediterranean, and Asian countries supports Bloom et al.'s (2001) contention that; "The demographic dividend is not, however, automatic. Given the right kind of policy environment, this demographic dividend can help to produce a sustained period of economic growth. . . ." Also, combining the finding (discussed earlier in the paper) that economic growth (for whatever reasons) became considerably more difficult beginning in the 1960-1975 and 1975-1992 for a sample of 94 developing countries. 
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